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NAVIGATING THE TAKINGS MAZE:   
THE USE OF TRANSFERS OF DEVELOPMENT 
RIGHTS IN DEFENDING REGULATIONS AGAINST 
TAKINGS CHALLENGES 
Jennifer Scro* 
I. INTRODUCTION:  
JUSTICE SCALIA VERSUS PENN CENTRAL 
Land use regulation, at whatever scale, typically generates passionate 
opposition from landowners whose private property has lost value, and 
their negative reactions often take the form of regulatory takings 
challenges based on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  In 
anticipatory response, many communities have instituted Transfer of 
Development Rights (“TDR”) programs to assist in defending their land 
use regulations against such takings challenges.1  TDRs allow regulated 
landowners to sell blocks of their development rights, unusable on the 
regulated sites under the terms of the challenged regulations, to 
purchasers who can use them to expand allowable development rights on 
designated off-site receiving parcels.2 The sale of TDRs can thus 
generate significant revenues for regulated property owners because 
purchasers are often willing to pay large sums for the right to use the 
                                            
 * B.A. College of the Holy Cross; J.D. Boston College Law School.  This Article 
was prepared under the auspices of an advanced seminar designed to promote research 
and publication of complex jurisprudential issues arising in contemporary land and 
environmental law.  The author wishes to thank the following seminar colleagues for 
their intensive critical input during the months of the seminar: Julia Bramley, Diana Cuff, 
Katelyn Homeyer, Heather Lacey, Zygmunt Plater, Eric Skeffington, and Mathew 
Todaro.   
 1. As of 2010, there are approximately 239 TDR programs currently in effect or 
proposed in the United States.  ARTHUR C. NELSON ET AL., THE TDR HANDBOOK: 
DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAMS, xxiv 
(2012). 
 2. See id. at xix-xx, xxii. 
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TDR credits to build at much greater intensity than otherwise allowed 
under existing land use regulations.3   
If TDRs are weighed as part of a court’s constitutional takings 
balance under the Penn Central formulation,4 then many such challenged 
land use regulations will be upheld, and the utility and market value of 
TDR programs will remain secure.  If, instead, the market value of TDRs 
is excluded from the regulatory validity balance, then many regulations 
would in all likelihood be struck down as excessively diminishing the 
regulated landowners’ property values.  Most courts follow the holding 
in Penn Central, written by Justice Brennan, and include TDRs as part of 
the landowner’s retained post-regulation property value in constitutional 
takings balances.5  Conversely, Justice Scalia argues, in a strongly-
worded concurring opinion, that TDRs should not be considered in 
determining the amount of property values lost by regulated landowners; 
rather, they should only be considered as part of a landowner’s 
compensation package after the courts, disregarding the value of TDRs, 
have found the challenged regulations unconstitutional.6  The difference 
between the two conflicting roles of TDRs in courtroom challenges, and 
the dialogue between these two approaches, will determine the future 
viability of TDRs as an innovative land use tool in defining the public-
private balances central to land regulation.  
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York is the central 
Supreme Court holding in the area of regulatory takings.  As in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,7 the Court’s first decision scrutinizing 
regulatory takings, the Court’s formulation in Penn Central took special 
notice of the degree of diminution of the regulated landowner’s property 
value.8  In Penn Central, the majority held that TDRs represent valuable 
                                            
 3. For example, in 2011 in Brookhaven, New York, a single TDR credit sold for 
about $88,000 on average.  Pine Barrens Credit Sales 1996 through 2012, PINE BARRENS 
CREDIT PROGRAM (TRANSFERS OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS), http://pb.state.ny.us/pbc/ 
pbc_credit_sales_ 1996_to_present.pdf (last updated Jan. 1, 2014).  In 2011 in 
Brookhaven, over twenty-six TDR credits were sold for a total sales value of over two 
million.  Id. 
 4. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978) 
(discussing Penn Central’s ad hoc test).  
 5. See ARDEB G, RATHKOPF ET AL., 3 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND 
PLANNING § 59:17 n.2  (4th ed.) and cases cited therein.     
 6. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 747-48 (1997) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 7. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 8. Compare id. at 415 (“The general rule at least is that while property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”), 
with Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (“In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual 
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property rights retained by regulated landowners and, as such, are 
directly relevant to the question of whether an excessive, invalid 
regulatory taking has occurred.9  Justice Brennan wrote: 
While these [TDR] rights may well not have constituted “just 
compensation” if a “taking” had occurred, the rights nevertheless 
undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has 
imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken into 
account in considering the impact of regulation [on the regulated 
landowner].10 
For Justice Brennan, therefore, the value of TDRs is a factor in the initial 
judicial determination of whether a regulation has “gone too far,” leaving 
the landowner with no reasonable economic return.11  If a regulation is 
indeed invalid, however, the TDR value may not be enough to constitute 
sufficient “just compensation” in the circumstances.12  Justice Scalia 
attacked the Penn Central majority’s formulation of the role of TDRs in 
his separate concurring opinion in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency.13  He put a semantic turn on the definition of remaining value in 
                                                                                                  
inquiries, the Court's decisions have identified several factors that have particular 
significance.  The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, 
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.  So, too, is the character of the 
governmental action.” (citation omitted)).  Thus, regulatory takings challenges are subject 
to the famous Penn Central balancing test that weighs the (1) economic impact; (2) 
interference with investment-backed expectations; and (3) character of government 
action.  Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.  This Penn Central triad essentially weighs private 
diminution against government interests.  See id. at 124-27 (describing various 
applications of the triad to specific cases).  The third element, “character of governmental 
action,” has been to denote weighing the public’s interest against the private diminution.  
PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 155-56 
(3rd ed. 2004); see Leigh E. Cummings III, Finding the Third Penn Central Prong in 
the Palazzolo Remand: Weighing the Public Purposes of Wetlands Protection 
after Palazzolo and Tahoe, in PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY, NATURE, 
LAW & SOCIETY 42, 42, 47-48 (Supp. 2007-2008), available 
at http://www.aspenlawschool.com/books/plater_environmentallaw/; see also Palazzolo 
v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The purposes 
served, as well as the effects produced, by a particular regulation inform the takings 
analysis.”). 
 9. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See infra pp. 14-15 and notes 34-40.  
 12. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137. 
 13. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 747-50 (1997) 
(Scalia, J. concurring). 
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the regulatory takings analysis, arguing that TDRs have no place in the 
constitutionality balance.14  Justice Scalia wrote: 
Just as a cash payment from the government would not relate to 
whether the regulation “goes too far” . . . but rather to whether 
there has been adequate compensation for the taking; and just as 
a chit or coupon from the government . . . would relate not to the 
question of taking but to the question of compensation; so also 
the marketable TDR, a peculiar type of chit . . . relates not to 
taking but to compensation.15 
Justice Scalia was thus insisting that TDRs could only be part of the 
compensation package once a court declares a regulation 
unconstitutional.16  As such, TDRs become nothing more than a “peculiar 
type of chit” or “coupon” from the government, not representing relevant 
value to the regulated landowner.17  
Justice Scalia’s formulation was seemingly rejected by Justice 
Brennan’s utilization of TDRs as an essential property right to be 
weighed in the takings regulatory balance.  Justice Scalia attempted to 
align his view with Penn Central’s holding by teasing out a distinction 
on the Penn Central facts.18  In Penn Central, the affected corporate 
property owner happened to have been able to use the TDR air rights 
from a regulated historic train station to substantially expand 
development on other properties it owned.19 Justice Scalia thus 
acknowledged a narrow exception to his denial of including TDR values 
in a Penn Central balancing test if a landowner could make personal use 
                                            
 14. See id. at 747. 
 15. Id.  
 16. See id. at 750 (“I suggest only that the relevance of TDRs is limited to the 
compensation side of the takings analysis, and that taking them into account in 
determining whether a taking has occurred will render much of our regulatory takings 
jurisprudence a nullity . . . .”). 
 17. See id. at 747.  Justice Scalia envisions TDRs as complicated governmental cash 
vouchers for compensation for land regulation.  Id.  Except, as Scalia notes, the cash 
comes from third party purchasers, rather than the government, and the government in 
turn reimburses the purchasers for their “outlay” with a “variance from otherwise 
applicable land-use restrictions.”  Id. at 748.  One commentator describes the Scalian 
view of TDRs as believing that TDRs are “arbitrary administrative variances from land 
use restrictions.”  Paul Merwin, Caught Between Scalia and the Deep Blue Lake: The 
Takings Clause and Transferable Development Rights Programs, 83 MINN. L. REV. 815, 
816 (1999). 
 18. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 748-49 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 19. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978). 
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of the TDRs.20  By restricting Penn Central’s holding to cases where 
development credits can be used by the regulated landowners 
themselves, Justice Scalia thereby separates TDRs from their status as 
“market value” rights and asserts that TDRs “have nothing to do with the 
use or development of the land to which they are (by regulatory decree) 
‘attached.’”21  
Justice Scalia was so disturbed by TDRs as a factor in the 
constitutional balance that he argued: “taking [TDRs] into account in 
determining whether a taking has occurred will render much of our 
regulatory takings jurisprudence a nullity.”22  He was perhaps building 
upon the not-unreasonable fear that to escape constitutional liability 
some governments might implement illusory TDR programs where the 
TDRs would, in reality, have minimal value.23  TDR programs, however, 
cannot serve in the constitutional balance as an escape valve for 
government liability in regulatory takings challenges if the TDRs have 
little value.24  All TDRs should be subjected to actual market value 
                                            
 20. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 748-49 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia reasoned 
that TDRs can be part of the constitutionality balance if transferred to a nearby lot owned 
by the same landowner, as had occurred in Penn Central.  Id.  He wrote:  
This [Penn Central] analysis can be distinguished from the case before us on the 
ground that it was applied to landowners who owned at least eight nearby parcels, 
some immediately adjacent to the terminal, that could be benefited by the 
TDRs.  The relevant land, it could be said, was the aggregation of the owners’ 
parcels subject to the regulation (or at least the contiguous parcels); and the use of 
that land, as a whole, had not been diminished.  It is for that reason that the TDRs 
affected “the impact of the regulation.” Id. at 749 (citation omitted). For Scalia, 
therefore, TDRs represent an essential property right only when property owners 
are able to transfer credits to other parcels they own.  Although Scalia typically 
refuses to look beyond the sending parcel for the takings analysis, see id. at 750, 
when regulated landowners can transfer TDRs to their own property, Scalia 
considers both the sending and receiving parcel.  
However, by confining TDRs to compensation and carving out an exception for personal 
use, Scalia deprives TDRs of their usefulness and value.  If TDRs do not represent real 
property rights with the potential to offset government liability in the regulatory validity 
analysis, then local governments have little incentive to implement TDR programs.  
Moreover, even if local governments create a TDR program there could be no TDR 
market because landowners could only transfer the credits to their own property.  If a 
landowner does not own another parcel in the receiving area, the TDR is essentially 
worthless.  
 21. See id. at 747.  
 22. Id. at 750.  
 23. See infra pp. 30-32 and notes 62-67.  
 24. See, e.g., Fred. F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 
387-88 (N.Y. 1976) (finding the specific TDRs at issue worthless). 
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analysis,25 and if their value is limited then their weight in constitutional 
balancing is accordingly minimized.   
Ultimately, Justice Scalia’s formulation in his separate Suitum 
opinion appears to be an attempt to increase the burden on governments 
defending regulations by deploying a combination of semantic 
distinctions.  On one hand, as noted above,26 he restricted the role of 
TDRs in the takings validity balance to situations of personal use by 
regulated landowners rather than acknowledging their marketability.  As 
a corollary semantic distinction, he thus sought to define TDRs in takings 
challenges in terms of the regulated landowners’ diminished property use 
rather than diminished value.27  Unless the landowners themselves could 
“use” the TDRs, they would not be weighed.  Their market value to the 
landowner would not be acknowledged under the Scalian formulation.  
The standard post-Penn Central constitutionality balance, however, does 
not turn on “use,” but rather turns on the degree to which affected 
landowners retain property value post-regulation.28  Because TDRs 
primarily serve to allow regulated landowners to recapture lost value by 
selling them in the marketplace, Justice Scalia’s semantic redefinition 
provides no place for TDRs in the constitutionality balance.  
The difference between Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia’s views is 
not merely an interesting semantic or theoretical tension, but rather a 
major issue in attacks on regulatory programs that use TDRs as part of 
their fairness balances.  If, as Justice Scalia argues, TDRs cannot be 
weighed toward the validity of regulatory programs, there is little 
practical governmental motivation to merely issue “coupons”29 to 
compensate for unconstitutional takings.30  Consequently, the usefulness 
and functionality of TDR programs would be lost.  TDR programs are 
                                            
 25. TDRs are only valuable insofar as there is a viable market demand for them. If 
few or none of a specific TDR program’s credits are being bought and sold, or are sold at 
a very low value, then the TDR’s weight in the constitutionality balance is accordingly 
reduced.  See e.g., Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d at 
388 (1976) (finding that TDRs had no effect on the validity given that the credits were 
worthless because there was no designated receiving area). 
 26. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
 27. Franklin G. Lee, Transferrable Development Rights and the Deprivation of All 
Economically Beneficial Use: Can TDRs Salvage Regulations That Would Otherwise 
Constitute A Taking?, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 679, 707-08 (1998). 
 28. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 350 (2002) (“[T]he categorical rule in Lucas was carved out for the extraordinary 
case in which a regulation permanently deprives property of all value.”).   
 29. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 747  (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 30. NELSON, supra note 1 at 100 (“[T]he Suitum decision may spell the beginning of 
the end for TDRs as protection against takings challenges.”). 
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only viable if the TDRs themselves are rightfully considered by courts to 
be both an essential property right and a fungible market asset.  
Among the many local government land use initiatives at stake in the 
debate over the viability of TDR programs are programs like 
conservation, open space, floodplain management, historic preservation, 
agricultural, and other regulations where, under worsening economic 
conditions, municipalities lack the funds needed to acquire fee simple 
interest.  TDRs, however, allow local governments to implement such 
regulations, which would otherwise be economically excessive, without 
purchasing the protected land outright.  Yet, if TDRs are relegated to the 
status of conjectural government coupons, as Justice Scalia insists, then 
TDRs’ potential to mitigate the property value impact of local 
government land use efforts is substantially undercut.31 This Article 
analyzes TDRs as part of a property owner’s “bundle of sticks” and 
therefore argues that their market value should be a mitigating factor in a 
takings analysis.  The second part of this Article notes the basic features 
of effective TDR programs.  Part III then explores the nuances of Justice 
Scalia’s arguments limiting the utility of TDRs in takings challenges.  
Part IV concludes that TDRs represent essential property rights and as 
such should be a functional factor in constitutionality balances as well as 
considerations of compensation should a court nevertheless find a 
regulation invalid.   
II. TDR BASICS 
Many communities implement TDR programs for their regulatory 
utility.32  In the classic zoning setting, transfers of development rights 
allow landowners to sever their rights to develop and sell those rights to 
another landowner to allow the receiving parcel to build at greater 
density than would otherwise be permitted under local zoning 
regulations.33  “Sending parcels” are typically regulated for lower density 
or environmental or historical significance, where protective regulations 
can severely diminish allowed uses and thereby the market value of the 
regulated areas.34  The following illustration from the Huron River 
                                            
 31. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 747 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 32. See NELSON, supra note 1, at xix; Lee, supra note 27, at 679-80.  
 33. Lee, supra note 27, at 680.  
 34. Rick Pruetz and Erica Pruetz, Transfer of Development Rights Turns 40, 59 AM. 
PLANNING ASS’N, PLANNING AND ENVTL. LAW 1 (2006). 
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Watershed Council in Ann Arbor, Michigan depicts how density credit 
type TDRs can operate.35  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illus. 1. Reprinted from Huron River Watershed Council, Economic Approach 
to Watershed Protection, http://www.hrwc.org/publications/smart-growth-
publications/transfer-of-development-rights/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2014). 
 
TDRs help alleviate the economic burden of land use controls by 
allowing regulated landowners to recapture some lost economic benefit 
by selling TDRs.  Consequently, the “receiving parcels” are often 
designated growth areas that attract developers with the ability to build 
beyond the constraints of zoning.  Effectively implemented TDR 
programs, therefore, can preserve environmentally sensitive and 
historically significant areas while spurring local development. 
TDRs have real economic value if well designed, which requires (1) 
clear sending and receiving parcels, and (2) a demand for the TDR rights 
in a functioning TDR market.36  A sending district is the area where TDR 
credits originate.  Thus, parcels in the sending district are typically 
protected by some regulation, and landowners are eligible for TDR 
credits. Alternatively, the receiving district is where the credits can be 
transferred.  For example, the map pictured below illustrates a TDR 
program on Long Island, New York meant to preserve the Long Island 
Pine Barrens.  This map makes clear the preserved parcels eligible for 
                                            
 35. Huron River Watershed Council, Economic Approach to Watershed Protection, 
http://www.hrwc.org/publications/smart-growth-publications/transfer-of-development-
rights/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).  
 36. NELSON, supra note 1 at 53; see Pruetz, supra note 34, at 4-5 (detailing TDR 
“success factors” and the actual detailed and complicated mechanics of a well-
functioning TDR program); John J. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An 
Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973); see generally NELSON, supra note 1 
(providing overview of the basic features of TDR programs, the economics behind TDRs, 
TDRs’ relationship with planning, and a model TDR ordinance). 
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TDR credits in the darker sending district, and the area the TDRs can 
betransferred to in the lighter-shaded receiving district.37  If a TDR 
program fails to designate a clear receiving district, then the TDRs will 
be worthless because the credits cannot be sold and used.  Similarly, to 
be truly valuable, TDR credits must be an attractive purchase to create a 
functioning TDR market.38   Often, TDR markets work best with a TDR 
“bank” to serve as an intermediary between the sellers and buyers.39 
Ultimately, TDR programs are tailored to the specific needs of each 
individual community.  Accordingly, the relative value of TDRs varies 
greatly.40  Towns can use TDRs to preserve a wide variety of areas 
including agricultural lands, historical monuments, and environmentally 
sensitive property.41  Due to the broad range of TDRs’ utility, the type of 
TDR will depend on the stated goals of the specific TDR program.  
If TDR values are excluded from the regulatory validity balance, 
then in many cases, regulations will be economically excessive.  TDRs 
can potentially mitigate government liability in takings because the value 
of the credits offsets the economic impact of the regulation.  TDRs allow 
a landowner to recapture the diminished property value caused by the 
regulation. For example, assume that before regulation Parcel A was 
worth $100,000 but after is worth $50,000; if the regulated landowner 
also receives $30,000 worth of TDR credits, then the owner can recover 
$30,000 of the $50,000 in lost value.  However, if the owner of Parcel A 
receives credits that are essentially worthless, the landowner cannot 
recover any lost value.  Accordingly, such TDRs should have little effect 
                                            
 37. NEW YORK STATE’S CENTRAL PINE BARRENS, Long Island Pine Barrens 
Protection Areas, http://pb.state.ny.us/maps_pdf/backup_Map-LIPB_core_cga_acres_ 
map.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2014). Note that this map is meant to be illustrative.  Id.  The 
final receiving areas do not correspond exactly to the compatible growth areas.  A map of 
the actual receiving areas in Riverhead, New York is available in Proposed Final Central 
Pine Barrens Plan and Supplement Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement, 
Chapter 6 Pine Barrens Protection Program, 90-91 (1995).  Although the actual receiving 
areas are more limited than the compatible growth areas depicted on the included map, 
the TDR program in the Long Island Pine Barrens has nonetheless been successful.  For 
example, in 2013 in Riverhead, New York, the average value of one “Pine Barrens 
credit” was $58,598.48.  NEW YORK STATE’S CENTRAL PINE BARRENS, Pine Barrens 
Credit Sales 1996 through 2013, http://pb.state.ny.us/pbc/pbc_credit_sales_1996_to_ 
present.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).    
 38. NELSON, supra note 1, at 53. 
 39. Sarah J. Stevenson, Banking on TDRs: The Government's Role As Banker of 
Transferable Development Rights, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1329, 1341-43 (1998). 
 40. Merwin, supra note 17, at 833 (“The exact form of development rights varies with 
each specific TDR program.”).  
 41. See id.; Pruetz, supra note 34, at 1.  
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in reducing government liability.  The graphic below depicts how TDRs 
allow regulated landowners to recover this lost value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. INTO THE MAZE:  
DEBATING TDRS’ ROLE IN THE TAKINGS VALIDITY BALANCE 
Should TDRs be a factor in the courts’ takings validity balance, or 
simply a form of compensation?  Section A presents Justice Brennan’s 
position in Penn Central that TDRs are a “mitigating” factor in the 
takings analysis.  Section B explains Justice Scalia’s position in Suitum 
that TDRs are governmental “coupons” that can only be used for 
compensation once a court finds a taking invalid.  Finally, Section C 
argues that Justice Scalia’s argument is an attempt to use TDRs to 
refocus the takings analysis on the lost property uses, rather than 
diminished economic value, thereby undercutting the validity of 
regulations. 
A. The Penn Central View: TDRs as “Mitigating” Factor 
In its landmark takings decision Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
City of New York, the United States Supreme Court considered TDRs as 
part of the takings balance.42  The Penn Central Court held that the 
                                            
 42. See 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978); NELSON, supra note 1, at 100.  Some commentators 
suggest that Penn Central is contradictory on this point because later in the case the court 
refers to TDRs in its compensation analysis.  Merwin, supra note 17, at 836; Penn Cent., 
438 U.S. at 122 (“whether the transferable development rights afforded appellants 
constitute ‘just compensation’ within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.”).  This 
Article, however, asserts that this language is not contradictory. Rather, the Penn Central 
court rightly noted that TDRs could be considered for both the constitutionality of the 
taking and for compensation.  The usefulness of TDRs to offset regulatory takings is not 
limited to either mitigation or compensation, but should be considered for both 
determinations. 
0 %
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constitutionality of a regulation depends on an ad hoc contextual balance 
of (1) the character of government action, (2) the regulation’s economic 
impact, and (3) its interference with investment-backed expectations.43  
Regarding TDRs’ place in this determination, Justice Brennan reasoned 
that the TDRs must be part of the constitutional balance.44  
Ultimately, the Penn Central balance is meant to weigh government 
interests against the diminution in property value caused by the 
regulation in question,45 in a constitutional context of democratic 
fairness.46  Thus, because TDRs offset the economic impact of the 
regulation upon the private landowner, Justice Brennan found that TDRs 
must be a factor in determining whether an unconstitutional taking has 
occurred.47   
Subsequently, other cases applied Penn Central’s balancing test to 
further define the modern regulatory takings framework.48  In 1987, in 
Keystone Bituminous, the Supreme Court clarified that in determining the 
value that a landowner has lost with the imposition of the regulation, 
courts should look to the pre-regulation value of the landowner’s entire 
“parcel-as-a-whole,” rather than simply the regulated property portion or 
right.49  Additionally, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Palazzolo 
reasoned that in weighing the character of government action, courts 
should not only consider diminution in value, but also the public purpose 
of the regulation.50 Finally, the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council court 
further highlighted that reasonable remaining value is the true measure of 
regulatory takings analysis, rather than the remaining uses available post-
regulation.51 In sum, the modern regulatory takings analysis weighs the 
                                            
 43. Penn. Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.  
 44. Id. at 137. 
 45. PLATER, supra note 8, at 1146.  
 46. Id. at 1154 (Justice O’Connor’s Palazzolo concurrence emphasizes public-private 
democratic fairness balance).  
 47. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136. 
 48. See PLATER, supra note 8, at 1155.  
 49. The same could be said of Penn Central in that the court did not consider the loss 
of air rights separately from the potential economic profitability of the entire terminal.  
Thus, the Penn Central court also weighed the private diminution against the pre-
regulation economic value of the entire parcel, rather than simply the loss of the regulated 
air rights.  
 50. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring); PLATER, supra note 8, at 
1154. 
 51. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 331 (2002).  
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diminution of private property value of the parcel as a whole against the 
regulation’s public purpose.52  
Accordingly, one reason that the Penn Central court may have 
included TDRs as a factor in the takings analysis is because the Penn 
Central TDRs were indeed valuable. In Penn Central, the Penn Central 
Transportation Co. claimed a taking after New York City’s Landmark 
Preservation law prohibited the company from building an office 
building over Grand Central Terminal.  The regulation effectively 
reduced the permissible zoning height over Grand Central, preventing 
Penn Central Co. from utilizing its air rights over the Terminal. New 
York City’s TDR program, however, allowed the company to transfer 
development rights to other parcels to build higher than the maximum 
permissible zoning height requirements in place. Nevertheless, Penn 
Central Transportation Co. could only transfer the credits to a limited 
number of parcels, and the process for receiving a transfer permit was 
complex, among other problems.53   
In recognizing these imperfections, the majority noted that 
“[a]lthough appellants and others have argued that New York City’s 
transferable development-rights program is far from ideal, the New York 
courts here supportably found, at least in the case of the Terminal, the 
rights afforded are valuable.”54  Here, the majority clearly regards the 
TDRs’ value as the most important feature for the credits’ stake in the 
takings analysis.  A TDR credit can be limited and imperfect, but so long 
as it retains legitimate economic value, it can still be used to mitigate 
government liability in regulatory takings challenges.55  Therefore, the 
amount that a TDR can mitigate the economic impact of the regulation 
will depend directly on the TDR’s real market value.56  
Justice Brennan reasoned that TDRs should be a factor in the 
regulatory validity balance because they represent a valuable asset 
property right in the bundle of sticks.57  By framing TDRs as a property 
right included in the constitutional balance, Justice Brennan drew from 
the arguments in the brief for the City of New York.58  The City argued 
                                            
 52. PLATER, supra note 8, at 1155.  
 53. John J. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of 
Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574, 585-89 (1972); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City 
of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 54. Penn. Cent., 438 U.S. at 137. 
 55. See id.  
 56. See id.  
 57. See id.  
 58. See Brief for Appellees at 20, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 
U.S. 104 (1978) (No. 77-444), 1978 WL 206883 at *11, *15.  
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explicitly that because the right to develop is a stick in the bundle of 
property rights, the Penn Central Transportation Co.’s TDRs represented 
a “valuable asset” that was fungible in the marketplace.59  Consequently, 
the City reasoned that given that TDRs represented a valuable market 
asset, the development credits preserved the economic value of the air 
rights above the terminal. 60  
B. Justice Scalia Responds:  
TDRs as Merely Relevant in Calculating Compensation 
In contrast to the Penn Central formulation, in his concurring 
opinion to Suitum, Justice Scalia argued that TDRs are not an essential 
property right that might mitigate takings liability, but rather a “coupon” 
from the government.61  For Scalia, TDRs merely represent an in lieu of 
cash “chit” that governments can use to pay affected landowners.62  As 
such, TDRs represent a form of compensation, relevant only after a court 
has declared a regulation invalid.63 By removing TDRs from the initial 
validity review, moreover, Scalia’s formulation would clearly 
substantially multiply the number of regulations struck down as invalid. 
Justice Scalia defined the transfer of TDRs as the creation of a new 
unit rather than a valuable property right in itself, thereby erasing TDRs’ 
applicability in the takings balance:  
TDRs, of course, have nothing to do with the use or development 
of the land to which they are (by regulatory decree) “attached.” 
The right to use and develop one’s own land is quite distinct 
from the right to confer upon someone else an increased power 
to use and develop his land. The latter is valuable, to be sure, but 
it is a new right conferred upon the landowner in exchange for 
the taking, rather than a reduction of the taking.64 
Here, Justice Scalia appears to admit that TDRs can have potential value, 
but attributes that value not to the affected land, but to rather the artificial 
new credit purchasable by the person buying the credit.65  By severing 
the value from the land affected by the regulation, Justice Scalia strips 
                                            
 59. See id.  
 60. See id. at 15.  
 61. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 747 (Scalia, J., concurring); NELSON supra note 1, at 100-01.  
 62. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 747-48.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 747.   
 65. Lee, supra note 27, at 700. 
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TDRs of their usefulness in defending the regulation.66  TDRs can only 
mitigate government liability to the extent that their value offsets the 
economic impact of the regulation upon the landowner’s property.67 To 
mitigate liability, the value of the TDR must inherently be attributable to 
the affected landowner.68 Under Justice Scalia’s reasoning, however, any 
potential for TDRs to mitigate the economic impact on the regulated 
landowner becomes moot as it is not a “use” of the landowner’s land, 
andthe economic value is only to whomever buys the credits.69  By 
severing TDRs’ value from the affected landowner’s property, Justice 
Scalia is able to justify his position that TDRs have no place in the 
constitutional balance.70   
Problematic elements and potential uncertainty in the particular Lake 
Tahoe TDR program in Suitum may have enhanced Justice Scalia’s 
rejection of TDRs as a property right.71  Whereas Penn Central’s TDRs 
had a restricted receiving area and a complex but financially tangible 
permit system, Lake Tahoe’s TDR program was far more complex, 
unusual, and uncertain.72  Although the Court ultimately upheld the Lake 
Tahoe regulation, the value of the Suitum TDR credits was quite 
uncertain because landowners could only use some types of TDR credits 
if they also received an additional type of credit distributed through a 
lottery system.73  Thus, the value of the plaintiff’s TDRs was in doubt, 
considering that the one TDR credit she received had limited 
                                            
 66. See NELSON, supra note 1, at 100. 
 67. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).  
 68. Id. 
 69. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 747 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 70. See id.; see also Lee, supra note 27, at 700; NELSON, supra note 1, at 100.  
 71. R.S. Radford, Takings and Transferable Development Rights in the Supreme 
Court: The Constitutional Status of TDRs in the Aftermath of Suitum, 28 STETSON L. REV. 
685, 691 (1999) (ultimately, because plaintiff never applied for the TDR program, the 
value of her TDR credits was unknown.  Consequently, the Supreme Court held that case 
was not ripe for adjudication).  
 72. See id. 
 73. Tahoe Regional Planning’s TDR program allowed landowners to receive three 
types of TDRs: (1) Residential Development Right (RDR); (2) Land Coverage Rights 
(LCR); and (3) Residential Allocations, which were awarded by lottery system.  To build 
using these credits a landowner needed both a RDR and RA.  Because plaintiff’s parcel 
was located in the received area, it automatically had an RDR credit with the possibility 
of receiving three bonus TDR credits.  RA credits, however, were only distributed by 
lottery.  At least one commentator defended TRPA’s lottery system as possibly “the most 
fair and equitable way to spread the burden of TRPA’s development restrictions over 
similarly situated landowners.”  Lee, supra note 27, at 706.  Still, RA credits were the 
most valuable TDRs, and the plaintiff had only a one in five chance of receiving it by 
lottery.  See Radford, supra note 71, at 691.  
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independent fungibility.74  In contrast, the Penn Central TDR program, 
however imperfect, was far more typical of TDRs in that all of the Penn 
Central credits were independently useful and valuable (on the regulated 
owner’s other properties or any other properties within the designated 
receiving area).75  The vagueness of the Lake Tahoe TDR program is 
perhaps one reason that Justice Scalia used it as an opportunity to portray 
TDRs as only a form of compensation, and a very minimal 
compensation, rather than a valuable property right in the 
constitutionality balance.76 
Despite Justice Scalia’s contrary arguments, many courts have 
followed the Penn Central holding by weighing TDRs in the takings 
validity balance in determining the economic impact of the regulation 
and its interference with investment-backed expectations.77  For example, 
in Gardner v. New Jersey Pineland Commission, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court directly considered TDRs as a significant factor in the 
takings balance.78  In Gardner, a farm owner challenged the state’s 
Pineland protection regulations that severely limited residential 
development and restricted all undeveloped land to agricultural use as an 
invalid uncompensated taking.79  The regulations created a TDR program 
for landowners in the Pineland protection area who incorporated the 
regulation’s restrictions into their deeds.  Once in conformity with the 
regulations, the New Jersey Pineland Commission awarded these 
landowners with Pineland Development Credits (PDCs) that enabled 
landowners to sell their development rights in “designated Regional 
Growth Areas.”80  Although many PDCs sold “privately at market 
prices,” at least one county’s PDC bank reported payments of $10,000 
per credit.81  In upholding the constitutionality of the regulations, the 
Gardner court adopted Brennan’s view that TDRs should be 
incorporated into the takings balance: “Penn Central could offset its loss 
by transferring valuable property rights to other properties, even if such 
transfers did not fully compensate it.  Plaintiff possesses the similar right 
to offsetting benefits; it may receive Pinelands Development Credits in 
return for recording the deed restrictions.”82  Thus, the potential 
                                            
 74. See Radford, supra note 71, at 691. 
 75. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).  
 76. See Radford, supra note 71, at 691. 
 77. See RATHKOPF, supra note 5, § 59:17 n.2 (4th ed.) and cases cited therein.  
 78. Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm’n, 593 A.2d 251, 261 (1991). 
 79. Id. at 253.  
 80. Id. at 256.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 261.  
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economic value of the PDCs factored into the Gardner court’s 
application of the Penn Central constitutionality balance.  
Likewise, in Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, the 
California Supreme Court rejected a facial takings challenge to a zoning 
ordinance that designated property open space because the ordinance 
also permitted the plaintiff to receive compensating density credits on 
adjoining parcels.83  Aptos Seascape Corporation (Seascape) had 
purchased 110 acres on the California coast.84  Subsequently, the 
countyadopted a comprehensive plan85 that designated seventy of these 
acres “[o]pen reserve park playground.”86  The zoning ordinance, 
however, also permitted the company to receive transferrable density 
credits.87  These credits allowed Seascape to build at a greater intensity 
than normally permitted under zoning regulations on its remaining forty 
acres that were not designated as open space.88  In upholding the validity 
of the ordinance, the court reasoned that because Seascape could receive 
and utilize the density credits, it was “free to pursue [its] reasonable 
investment expectations.”89  The Aptos Seascape court, therefore, 
weighted the potential value and utility of the transferrable density 
credits in determining the regulation’s constitutionality.90 
Still, TDRs cannot entirely shield government from takings liability.  
A taking can still be unconstitutional despite the presence of a TDR 
program if the TDRs are insufficiently valuable. In Fred French F. 
Investing Co., v. City of New York, the New York Court of Appeals 
rejected a zoning amendment as unconstitutional, despite the 
amendment’s TDR program, because the city did not designate any 
receiving parcels for the credits.91  Without available receiving parcels, 
                                            
 83. Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191, 199-200 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1982). 
 84. Id. at 193.  
 85. A “comprehensive plan” outlines the city or town’s goals and reasoning for its 
local land use regulations for a period of time.  California is known as a “plan state,” 
meaning that local governments are required by state statute to implement such plans.  
See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 3.16 (5th ed. 2003); Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & 
Jonathan D. Witten, Windfalls, Wipeouts, Givings, and Takings in Dramatic 
Redevelopment Projects: Bargaining for Better Zoning on Density, Views, and Public 
Access, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 325, 332 (2005).  
 86. Aptos Seascape Corp., 188 Cal. Rptr. at 193.  
 87. Id. at 200.  
 88. See id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. See id.  
 91. Fred F. French Investing Co., v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 388-89 (N.Y. 
1976). 
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the TDRs were only “disembodied abstractions of man’s ingenuity, 
float[ing] in . . . limbo,” and, therefore, essentially worthless.92  The 
court, however, made clear that valuable TDRs would still be considered 
in determining a regulation’s validity: 
[T]he development rights are an essential component of the 
value of the underlying property because they constitute some of 
the economic uses to which the property may be put. As such, 
they are a potentially valuable and even a transferable 
commodity and may not be disregarded in determining whether 
the ordinance has destroyed the economic value of the 
underlying property.93 
Given that TDRs’ weight in the validity balance is contingent on 
their economic value, if the TDRs are worthless, as in French, they will 
have no impact on the balance.94   
                                            
 92. Id. at 388.  
 93. Id. at 387. 
 94. Despite the fact that TDRs do not automatically circumvent takings liability under 
the Penn Central takings balance, Scalia feared that local governments could use TDR 
programs to circumvent liability under what would otherwise constitute an 
unconstitutional taking under his holding in Lucas.  See Merwin, supra note 17, at 841-
43.  Writing for the majority in Lucas, Justice Scalia held that a regulation that deprives a 
landowner of all economic value is a categorical taking.  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).  Unlike Penn Central, the Lucas analysis did not 
balance or consider the weight of government interests at all.  See id.  If, however, a TDR 
regulation grants regulated landowners viable and valuable credits, the landowners retain 
some economic value and, therefore, do not fall under Lucas’s per se taking rule.  
Merwin, supra note 17, at 842-43.  Regulations that fall short of Lucas’s complete 
economic deprivation standard—as virtually all do—are analyzed under the Penn Central 
balancing test.  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 303 (2002) (“Lucas was carved out for the “extraordinary case” in which a 
regulation permanently deprives property of all use; the default rule remains that a fact 
specific inquiry is required in the regulatory taking context.”).  Moreover, if, as in 
French, the TDRs are worthless, the credits will not relieve the government of liability 
under either Lucas or Penn Central.  Nevertheless, it could well have been the potential 
of TDRs to “sidestep” Lucas that prompted Scalia to argue that allowing TDRs as 
mitigation in the takings analysis would “render much of our regulatory takings 
jurisprudence a nullity.” Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 749 
(1997) (Scalia, J. concurring); Merwin, surpa note 17, at 840-41. 
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C. Justice Scalia’s Use of TDRs to Reorient the 
Focus of the Takings Analysis on Diminished Property Use 
Justice Scalia’s framing of the takings review role of TDRs focuses 
on the degree of actual use rights in regulated land before and after 
regulation, rather than the value of the land to the regulated landowner.95  
Framed this way, because TDRs do nothing to mitigate the diminished 
use of a regulated parcel they are irrelevant to a Scalian takings test and 
regulations will more easily be struck down.  
Even if TDRs allowed an affected landowner to re-capture the entire 
value lost due to regulation, Justice Scalia’s emphasis on regulated use 
rather than value would mean that the regulation could nevertheless still 
be void as an excessive regulatory burden on the landowner. 
Justice Scalia’s stratagem, reframing TDRs to undercut regulations’ 
validity, echoes similar previous attempts where he focused on 
properties’ active use rather than owners’ remaining property values.  In 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, he asserted that regulation is 
categorically unconstitutional when it “denies an owner economically 
viable use of his land.”96  Although in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation 
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Supreme Court 
clarified that diminished value is the true focus of the taking analysis,97 
Scalia strongly disagreed by joining the Thomas dissent, which stressed 
the importance of deprived use over diminished value: “[n]o one 
seriously doubts that the land-use regulations at issue rendered 
petitioners' land unsusceptible of any economically beneficial use. . . . 
These individuals and families were deprived of the opportunity to build 
single-family homes . . . on land upon which such construction was 
authorized when purchased.”98 
Thus, Scalia regards the takings analysis as protecting landowners’ 
physical uses of their property.  Inherently suspicious of government 
regulation, Scalia’s “use” formulation would create an even lower 
threshold for regulatory invalidity because lost use definitions tend to 
                                            
 95. See Lee, supra note 27, at 708-09. 
 96. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 (emphasis added) (quoting  Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 
U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
 97. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331; see also PLATER, supra note 8, at 1160-61.  
 98. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at  355 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Scalia’s 
opinions evince a marked antagonism to regulation of private property, even referring to 
government as a “thief” in his Palazzolo concurrence.  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 
U.S. 606, 637 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).  Thus, for Scalia, one way to protect 
landowners from this governmental “thief” is to relegate TDRs to a government 
“coupon” and confine their viability merely to post-verdict compensation. 
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incorporate the landowner’s optimistic individual plans.99  In contrast, an 
analysis based on appraisals of market value is substantially more 
objective.100  Accordingly, because TDRs restore ascertainable lost value 
to regulated landowners, they deserve a place in the constitutionality 
balance. 
As to Justice Scalia’s narrowly acknowledged exception—allowing 
TDRs to weigh in the constitutional balance only when the regulated 
landowners themselves could “use” them themselves on their own 
adjacent lands—a number of courts have expressly rejected that view 
and instead incorporated Penn Central’s formulation that TDRs are a 
mitigating factor when TDR transfers are to third parties.101  In Good v. 
United States, the Federal Claims Court upheld the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers’ denial of a permit to drain and fill protected wetlands against 
a takings challenge by considering the value of $110,000 worth of TDR 
credits to the plaintiff.102 The Good court expressly rejected Justice 
Scalia’s Suitum argument:  
While the concurring Justices in Suitum clearly indicate 
opposition to this proposition [that TDRs are relevant to 
determining takings liability], their opinion underscores the 
Court's reaffirmance of the Penn Central holding that the value 
of TDRs is to be considered to answer the threshold question of 
whether a taking has occurred.103  
                                            
 99. See Brian Crossman, The Use-Value Distinction in Regulatory Takings Law: Which 
Property Interest is Protected by the Constitution, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY, 
NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY 96, 100 (Supp. 2004-2005), available at http://www. 
aspenlawschool.com/books/plater_environmentallaw/updates/21_Crossman_Takings_Use_
Value_Article.pdf.    For example, in Palazzolo the plaintiff’s diminution arguments used 
Mr. Palazzolo’s hopes to build seventy-four single-family homes in an eighteen-acre marsh 
as the basis of their loss of use calculation. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616. 
 100. Crossman, supra note 99, at 103.  
 101. Some jurisdictions do not allow TDRs to serve as any form of compensation 
because state constitutions require payment for takings to be in cash.  For example, the 
Arizona appeals court found a zoning ordinance unconstitutional but refused to consider 
TDRs as part of the landowner’s compensation package because the “state constitution 
requires compensation for a taking to be made by payment of money in an amount that 
has been judicially determined.” Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 528, 540 (Ct. 
App. 1985) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 720 P.2d 513 (Ariz. 1986).  Because TDRs 
represent a fungible market asset rather than straight cash, TDRs could never constitute 
adequate compensation under state constitutions.  Consequently, whatever small utility 
TDRs retain under Scalia’s personal use exception would disappear at the state level. 
 102. 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 84, 107, 114  (Fed. Cl. 1997) aff’d, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
 103. Id. at 108. 
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Although Scalia attempts to evade Penn Central with his personal 
use exception, the Good court reveals the contradiction.  The Penn 
Central Court’s calculation that TDRs are part of the constitutionality 
inquiry applies to all TDR programs, not simply credits transferred 
between the same landowner.  
IV. INCLUDING TDRS IN THE TAKINGS CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE 
If courts followed Justice Scalia’s lead in truncating the nature and 
role of TDRs in takings balances, the functionality of economically 
viable TDR programs would be severely undercut.  With TDRs stripped 
of their practicality, local governments would have little incentive to use 
TDR programs and would be further discouraged from enacting 
regulations that might be vulnerable without them.  In the event that 
TDRs are relegated to government coupons, bereft of regulatory force, 
local governments would not implement them and property owners 
would not buy them.   
Therefore, to maintain TDRs’ continuing viability, courts should 
consider TDRs as a mitigating property right both in the takings analysis 
itself and for potential post-verdict compensation.  By including TDRs in 
both analyses, courts can preserve TDRs’ status as essential property 
rights and market assets, and ensure that diminished value is the proper 
measure of the takings analysis.   
Accordingly, to accomplish these functions transparently, courts 
appropriately proceed with a three-step approach.104  First, a court 
considers the economic effect of the regulation on the property value in 
order to establish the degree to which the challenged regulation has 
depleted the market value of the regulated property.105  Using accepted 
courtroom appraisal methods, financial impact is determined objectively 
by comparing the property’s economic value before and after the 
regulation.106  The constitutional balancing test effectively determines 
how much the regulation has diminished the property’s economic value 
and the extent to which TDRs allow landowners to recapture some of 
that lost value.107 
                                            
 104. See, e.g., Gardner, 593 A.2d at 261; Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So.2d 1030, 
1036 (Fla. 1st. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192 
n.14 (Ct. Cl. 1981); RATHKOPF, supra note 5 (collecting cases).  
 105. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 106. Gardner, 593 A.2d at 205. 
 107. Id.  
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Second, a court weighs the value of such TDR credits.108  If the TDR 
credits are valuable, then the constitutional balance will tip in favor of 
regulatory validity because the credits will reduce the economic 
diminution caused by the regulation.  In contrast, if the TDR credits have 
only slight value, then the constitutional balance will remain unchanged.  
Moreover, Justice Scalia’s fear that TDRs will circumvent takings 
liability is unfounded because if a TDR program produces credits of 
inadequate value, then the program will have little to no impact on 
mitigating government liability in takings.  Finally, if a court finds an 
unconstitutional taking—the regulation is unconstitutionally excessive, 
notwithstanding the TDRs’ value—then TDRs will also appropriately be 
considered in determining compensation.109 
Justice Brennan in his majority decision in the classic Penn Central 
case and Justice Scalia in his separate Suitum opinion set out starkly 
conflicting notions of TDRs’ role in regulatory takings.  Justice Brennan 
asserted that TDRs are a significant factor to be weighed in the 
constitutionality balance, in determining whether a regulation has gone 
too far in imposing economic burdens on regulated landowners.  Justice 
Scalia instead argued that TDRs must be excluded from the takings 
balance and only considered as partial compensation when regulations 
are struck down, as many would be, if balanced without TDRs. Justice 
Scalia attempts to focus the takings analysis on loss of actual physical 
use of land, rather than the more normal focus on the extent of a property 
owner’s diminished value.  Viewed in context, Justice Scalia’s semantic 
formulations fundamentally multiply a regulation’s negative effect on a 
regulated landowner, excluding the very real retained private values 
attributable to transferable credits in well-designed TDR programs.  
Instead, to support TDRs’ continuing utility, courts rightfully consider 
TDRs based on their actual ascertained market value in navigating the 
complex mazes presented by constitutional takings cases.  
  
                                            
 108. See id. at 124-28. 
 109. Id. at 130.  Although TDRs alone might not fully constitute “just” compensation, 
they should still be included in the final compensation package.  For example, if “just 
compensation” is $100,000 and a regulated landowner has $30,000 in TDR credits, then the 
TDRs should be included as compensation to force the government to pay the difference—
$70,000.  The amount that TDRs contribute toward the regulated landowner’s 
compensation, like the constitutionality balance, will depend on their value. 
